Mobile tactical networks facilitate communication, coordination, and information dissemination between soldiers in the field. Their increasing use provides important benefits, yet also makes them a prime enemy target. Furthermore, their dynamic, distributed, and ad-hoc nature makes them particularly vulnerable to cyber attack. Unfortunately, most existing research on cybersecurity in mobile ad-hoc networks either uses simplistic mobility models that are easier to analyze mathematically or focuses on modeling the dynamics of civilian networks.
Introduction

Motivation
Mobile tactical networks (MTNs) have become ubiquitous in military operations, supporting communication, coordination, and information dissemination between human and autonomous assets. 1, 2 The growing push for ''data to the tactical edge'' for example the increasing availability of such information and communication to soldiers at lower echelons of the military hierarchy, has resulted in technologies that are more mobile, light-weight, and usable by soldiers on the battlefield. WIN-T (Warfighter Information Network-Tactical), the network technology currently being used by the U.S. Army to support tactical operations in the absence of fixed cyber infrastructure, has improved from and other capabilities. The latest version, built on the Samsung Galaxy Note II, is planned to be fielded by platoon, squad, and team leaders in three brigade combat teams in the near future. 4, 5 To maximize robustness in remote locations and when on the move, MTNs are increasingly decentralized and ad-hoc, often utilizing short-range wireless connections to facilitate communication instead of relying on established longer-range cyber infrastructure. While this may make them more agile and adaptable to changing conditions and battlefield dynamics, it also increases the attack surface, introducing additional security risks that are more difficult to mitigate than in centralized, static networks. In addition, to reduce time to deployment, military decision-makers often choose to rely on modified versions of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware or software instead of developing new technologies from scratch, which can also introduce security vulnerabilities. Many examples of malware have been observed which take advantage of security gaps in hardware, software, or communication protocols to infiltrate and spread through mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), giving attackers the ability to sabotage, control, or gain access to targeted assets. [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] It is therefore critical to develop effective defensive mechanisms to protect cyber networks at the tactical edge. Although low-level techniques such as those proposed in Kidston et al. 12 can be highly effective in preventing and detecting intrusions, the threat of zero-day attacks and a continuously evolving attack surface make high-level cybersecurity analysis and risk mitigation another important component of a robust cyber defense solution.
Since cyber attacks are also a growing concern in the civilian world, there have been significant research efforts to improve cybersecurity in MANETs. [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] The movement of military units, however, often obeys patterns dictated by the structure of the organizational hierarchy and chain of command. The unique characteristics of movement within MTNs is reflected in their patterns of communication and differentiates them from mobile networks in other contexts, possibly rendering results based on other models inaccurate. For example, as demonstrated in , the interplay between such structured mobility patterns and proximity-based propagating malware cannot be easily captured by traditional mathematical models for epidemic disease spread. This highlights the need to develop domain-specific models that capture the dynamics of mobile units in military networks in order to test and validate assumptions regarding the spread of malware on MTNs.
Agent-based simulation, a modeling methodology for analyzing the effects of individuals' actions and interactions on a dynamic system, is particularly well-suited to express the hierarchical organizational and spatial structures exhibited by MTNs. Representing each soldier or organizational unit as an agent allows fine-grained control over their properties and behaviors, making it possible to represent complex relationships and dependencies that cannot be captured by more abstract models. On the other hand, while military field exercises or human-in-the-loop virtual war games may be more realistic ways to play out different scenarios and strategic choices, agent-based simulations can be performed many times faster and at a fraction of the cost, enabling a more comprehensive evaluation. In this work, we introduce an agent-based modeling framework to represent and study malware spread in mobile tactical networks.
First, we identify several properties of military operations that distinguish MTNs from other MANET applications (and therefore should be captured by our model):
• Hierarchical organizational structure: military units are organized in a hierarchical fashion, in which large units of many soldiers are split into smaller subunits, which are further divided into subsubunits.
• Mission-driven: the actions taken by military units are decided upon by unit leaders in fulfillment of an overarching mission.
• Chain of command: units operate under a hierarchical system of command that parallels their organizational structure, in which commands flow from the highest to the lowest levels of the military hierarchy, at each level adding greater specificity in support of the larger mission.
• Group mobility: unit movement also parallels the organizational structure, with units that are closer to one another in the hierarchy tending to move together or have greater physical proximity.
Contributions and outline
The main contribution of this paper is an agent-based modeling framework designed to represent mission and task assignment, unit movement, communication, malware spread, and defensive strategies in mobile tactical networks. At the heart of our framework is the relationship between hierarchical command and control, and group mobility. Modeling that relationship is essential to studying cybersecurity in mobile tactical networks, yet it has been largely ignored by existing models. This paper builds on previous work by the authors, integrating several previous models into a unifying framework and synthesizing results to demonstrate its usefulness. In Thompson and Morris-King 18 , a new mobility model was proposed to represent the hierarchical organizational structure and corresponding group movement typical in military contexts. This hierarchical model was used to implement an agent-based simulation of troops making excursions into a town harboring enemy soldiers. In Thompson et al. 19 , the same simulation model was used to explore the relative effectiveness of defensive strategies in slowing the spread of malware through a cyber network formed by short-range wireless communication between mobile devices carried by the soldiers. In Thompson and Harang 20 , a different agent-based model was used to determine key locations at which to establish remediation stations to best control the spread of malware across a tactical region of towns connected by a road network.
The conceptual framework proposed by the current paper encompasses the models utilized in the aforementioned work and is the primary contribution of this paper; the implementation and experiments are secondary and for the purpose of illustration. Our framework is not intended to be a comprehensive model of mobile tactical networks, but rather to fill in a key component missing from existing models: the connection between organizational structure, movement patterns, and cybersecurity. In conjunction with higher-fidelity models of other aspects of mobile tactical networks such as mission and task definitions, the tactical environment and terrain, wireless communication, and cyber attack and defense, our framework can serve as a useful tool for military decision-makers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents related work. Section 3 introduces our agent-based modeling framework. Section 4 presents three example scenarios. Section 5 focuses on one scenario, describing a set of simulation experiments and the results. Section 6 concludes the paper and suggests directions for future research.
2 Related work 2.1 Models of malware spread Mathematical models of virus spread were first developed in the context of biological epidemics, primarily compartmental models which assume homogeneous interaction rates within the population, such as the well-known SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Recovered) model 21 and its numerous variants. Kephart and White apply compartmental models to study the dynamics of malware spread in cyber networks, additionally using simulation to evaluate under which assumptions the compartmental models are most accurate. 22 They consider several network topologies, such as Erdos-Renyi random graphs, connected regular graphs, and sparse graphs with a high clustering coefficient. In all of these topological models they study the number of infected nodes in the population over time and how various factors affect convergence to a steady state, finding that in many cases there exists a sharp epidemic threshold. Others have extended such models to additional network topologies and contexts. For example, Boguna et al. 23 and Dezs} o et al. 24 focus on epidemic models for power-law networks.
Mickens et al. study device-to-device spreading of malicious software in MANETs by explicitly modeling node mobility. 25, 26 Valler et al. develop a framework for analyzing malware spread in MANETs under the SIS (Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible) model. 27 Su et al. perform simulations using trace data drawn from real-life sampling of over 10,000 devices in a commuter train station to examine the propagation dynamics of Bluetooth worms, showing that Bluetooth worms can infect a large population of vulnerable devices relatively quickly in an urban environment. 28 On the other hand, Wang et al. model the spread of malware across networks of mobile phone users and observe that Bluetooth-based malware spreads slowly due to the short range of Bluetooth and therefore the relatively low contact rate between devices. 29 Channakeshava et al. demonstrate via simulation on synthetic wireless networks using activity-based models of urban population mobility that the time it takes for a Bluetooth-based worm to spread throughout a network is highly dependent on the effectiveness of countermeasures taken within the first hour after it is introduced to the network. 30 Military networks are often deployed in areas deemed otherwise unsuitable for civilian telecommunication networks, meaning a higher degree of network sparsity and likelihood of environmental or adversarial disruption. In addition, movement of military units is usually highly structured due to the hierarchical organization of the military. Furthermore, military units often shift between tactical objectives, which is reflected in changing movement patterns. These real-world complexities make existing models unsuitable for modeling the propagation of malware in MTNs.
Mobility models
To model complex group behavior, Hong et al. introduce the Reference Point Group Mobility (RPGM) model, an agent-based model in which each group's macro-scale movement is governed by the trajectory of a reference point, and each individual's micro-movements are described by random motion within a bounded region centered at its group's reference point, so that the coordinate system of each group member's movement maintains the reference point's current position as its origin. 31 Blakely et al. propose the Structured Group Mobility Model (SGMM), which replaces the random motion of group members in the RPGM model with pre-defined structured movement to represent fixed movement patterns often used in tactical contexts. 32 Fongen et al. propose the Hierarchical Group Mobility (HGM) model as a generalization of RPGM from a two-level to a multi-level hierarchy, where the net movement of an entity is the aggregation of all of its ancestors' individual movements (including itself). 33 HGM allows for units at different levels or even different units at the same level of the hierarchy to operate under different mobility models.
Rollo and Komenda propose a more realistic mobility model for tactical networks in which units are called on to fulfill mission tasks. 34 Different unit types can have different micro-movement patterns, and macro-movements are performed by groups of units by assigning them a common waypoint corresponding to a task location. Pakbaz et al. developed TraJECT-3D, an agent-based simulation tool that generates mobility traces for tactical MANETs based on walks on a graph representing the topology of the terrain. 35 Group mobility is implemented as units staying within a diamond region around a designated group leader, and macro-movements are expressed via a dynamic transition matrix corresponding to probabilistic traversal of graph edges, which could be specific to a unit or group.
In this paper, we propose a general framework for modeling MTNs that adapts ideas from all of the above models, but we loosen the requirement of the group mobility models that entities must inherit the motion of their ancestors in the hierarchy, and we allow greater flexibility than the latter models in defining mobility patterns. In our model, each unit in the unit hierarchy may have a location, trajectory, and mission objective or task, and subunits may either inherit directly from their supervising units or define their own objectives and movement based on knowledge of the objectives and movement of their supervisors. This better represents real-world tactical networks, in which command flows down the organizational hierarchy, but subordinate units often have some degree of autonomy in determining their own behavior while working toward a larger mission objective.
Next we present our models of organizational hierarchy, mobility, and malware propagation in MTNs.
Modeling framework
Our agent-based modeling framework is based on three principal classes of objects: Unit, Region, and Task. Each Unit corresponds to a mobile agent, defined by a set of properties (e.g. location, speed, and current Task) and a set of possible behaviors (e.g. movement patterns). A Region corresponds to a bounded spatial area. A Task represents a tactical order that a Unit might receive.
To demonstrate the usefulness of our modeling framework, we develop an implementation in Java and use it to perform simulations of several example scenarios (see Sections 4 and 5) .
First, we present our framework in greater detail.
Organizational model
The Unit is the basic mobile object in our model. Subclasses of the Unit class may correspond to specific tactical units such as Company, Platoon, Squad, or Soldier. Our model also allows for a greater level of specificity, such as Light Infantry Platoon or First Lieutenant. A Unit can either be composite, meaning that it is composed of some number of subUnits, or atomic, meaning that it does not contain any sub-Units. Listing 1 shows a partial implementation of the Unit class.
The relational structure of sub-Units and superUnits forms what we call the unit hierarchy. Our implementation is based on the U.S. Army's unit hierarchy. A company in the U.S. Army is usually made up of three to five platoons, and a platoon typically consists of two to four squads of 8-10 soldiers each, depending on each unit's type and designated function. 36 . Figure 1 illustrates an example unit hierarchy, with Companies labeled by Greek letters, Platoons within a Company indexed with Arabic numerals, and Squads within a Platoon indexed with lower case letters. Here, Companies and Platoons are composite Units, while Squads are atomic.
In a real tactical setting, high-ranking officers may give orders to their subordinates which altogether aim to achieve mission goals. Those orders flow down the chain of command, at each level adding greater specificity in support of the larger mission. We capture this dynamic in our model by assigning mission directives to Units at the highest level of the hierarchy, represented as sequences of Tasks to perform, each of which in turn gets propagated down the hierarchy. Listing 2 shows a partial implementation of the Task class.
Upon receiving a Task, in addition to changing its behavior appropriately, a composite Unit also assigns Tasks to its sub-Units, which may depend on its own Task, its and their Unit subclasses, places in the hierarchy, properties (e.g. location), environment, and other factors. The physical behavior of a Unit is represented by its movement patterns, which are described below.
Spatial and mobility model
The Region is the basic spatial object in our model. In our simulations, we implement Regions as being circular, defined by a center point and a radius, because it allows for efficient testing of whether a unit is in a Region. Regions can be used to describe the physical environment as well as conceptual boundaries. For example, a Region could represent a town or a no-fly zone. Region can also be subclassed (see below for examples). Listing 3 shows a partial implementation of the Region class.
A Unit's movement may depend on its environment, current Task, Unit subclass, place in the hierarchy, and other properties (e.g. location, speed, and direction), as well as on the properties of its super-Units. Note that this flexible infrastructure includes the HGM model introduced in Fongen et al. as a special case. 33 In our implementation, we consider several basic movement patterns:
• Single Waypoint: move toward a specified location; • Random Walk: change speed and/or direction at each time step; • Random Waypoint: randomly select a location in the simulation space, move to it, and then repeat;
• Random Walk in Region: like Random Walk, but constrained to within the boundary of a specified region; • Random Waypoint in Region: randomly select a location in a specified region, move to it, and then repeat; • Graph Random Walk: given a graph with vertices corresponding to Regions and a starting vertex, randomly select a neighboring vertex, move to it, and then repeat; • Graph Random Waypoint: given a graph with vertices corresponding to Regions and a starting vertex, randomly select another vertex in the graph, traverse a shortest path to it, and then repeat. More complex movement patterns are possible by composing these basic movements hierarchically, as well as by performing them in sequence.
Cyber model
Any Unit in our model may carry a mobile device that facilitates short-range wireless communication, such as Bluetooth, on the battlefield. Each device regularly scans the environment for nearby friendly devices. When two friendly devices come within communication range, they automatically connect, enabling data transmission. Due to its prevalence among mobile devices, we base our implementation on Bluetooth technology and will use that as our running example. We model self-propagating malware that spreads between Bluetooth-enabled mobile devices. Whenever a Unit carrying an infected device (Unit.isInfected = TRUE) comes within communication range of a friendly Unit carrying an uninfected device (Unit. isInfected = FALSE), the two devices connect and the malware spreads. For simplicity, we model malware transmission as occurring instantaneously.
Enemy forces may attempt to infiltrate the allied cyber network by infecting allied devices with the malware, for example if one of the allied soldiers is a spy, or by infecting the device of a captured soldier, or by deploying cyber hacking teams that can infect allied devices remotely.
Allied forces may enact counter-measures to protect their cyber network from attack. For example, they may protect some units by equipping their devices with more robust anti-malware technology (Unit.isProtected = TRUE). Alternatively, they may establish Protected Regions in which malware cannot spread (e.g. due to Bluetooth jamming technology), DetectionRegions in which sensors are able to detect infected devices, or RemediationRegions where units can go to have their devices reset, replaced, or otherwise cleaned of malware. 
Scenarios
We now describe several example scenarios that we have implemented using the agent-based modeling framework described above. Visualizations are generated using the Repast Simphony modeling and simulation environment. 37 
Scenario 1: excursions into a town
We first consider a scenario in which several companies of soldiers equipped with mobile devices are stationed at outposts around the periphery of a town harboring enemy soldiers. Their mission, as given to them by their superiors in the chain of command, is to secure the town by conducting excursions into the town seeking out and engaging with enemy soldiers.
For this scenario, we use the unit hierarchy shown in Figure 1 , with each Company consisting of four Platoons, each containing four Squads. As soldiers in a squad typically stay in close physical proximity to one another, it is assumed that if one soldier's device gets infected, all devices carried by members of the squad will soon be infected. Therefore, for the purpose of this scenario we consider the squad to be an atomic unit and do not explicitly model behavior at the scale of individual soldiers.
The town and outposts are each represented by a Region. Each Company has a designated outpost to which its constituent Platoons return after each excursion into the town. After resting at (Task.HOLD) or patrolling (Task.PATROL, implemented using the Random Waypoint in Region movement pattern) its designated outpost for some amount of time, a Platoon is assigned a target location in the town, and all Squads in that Platoon travel to the location together (Task.GOTO, implemented using the Single Waypoint movement pattern). Once there, each Squad operates independently, spreading out from the other Squads in the Platoon in order to cover more ground as they investigate the nearby area (Task.EXPLORE, implemented using the Random Walk in Region movement pattern). After some period of time, all of the Squads in the Platoon return to their Company's outpost (Task.GOTO) to rest before being sent out again.
In an attempt to infiltrate the allied cyber network, the enemy deploys a cyber hacking team somewhere in the town, represented by an InfectionRegion. When an allied soldier moves within range of the Infection Region, the enemy cyber team hacks into the soldier's device and infects it with self-propagating Bluetooth malware, which then spreads to other allied devices as the soldiers continue carrying out their tactical objectives. To slow the spread of the malware, allied forces may establish ProtectedRegions at some of the outposts, which prevent malware from spreading between Units at those outposts. Figure 2 gives a screenshot of this scenario, implemented in Java with Repast Simphony. The large Region represents the town, the smaller Regions around the town's periphery represent outposts, and the red Infection Region represents the range of the enemy cyber hacking team. Squads are initially blue, and become red when infected, which occurs when they come within range of the enemy cyber team or an already-infected Squad.
Scenario 2: traversing a road network
Similarly to Scenario 1, this scenario involves companies of soldiers equipped with mobile devices being deployed to towns represented by Regions. Here, however, we consider a larger field of view, representing the longerterm dynamics of forces operating on a battlefield consisting of multiple towns connected by a road network. As time goes on, a Company may get redeployed, at which point it traverses a shortest-path route from its current town to the designated town through the road network. This could be implemented using the Graph Random Walk or Graph Random Waypoint movement pattern.
Some towns are controlled by the enemy and contain cyber hacking teams that attempt to infect allied Units passing nearby; these are designated as Infection Regions. Other towns are under allied control and have been established as RemediationRegions; any allied Units entering such towns pass through a checkpoint where their devices are replaced or cleaned of malware.
For simplicity, and to increase simulation speed, one may choose to only model the Company level of the unit hierarchy explicitly, treating Companies instead of Squads as the atomic units. When a Company is deployed at or passes through an InfectedRegion, we make the worst-case assumption that the enemy hackers will be able to infect at least one of the soldiers, and that the malware will spread to the whole Company as the troops rally before traveling to the next town. In addition, we assume that if two Companies are deployed to the same town simultaneously, or if one Company passes through the town where the other is deployed, or if two Companies pass each other on a road, there will be at least some contact between the Companies; therefore, if one of them is infected, the other will also become infected. Figure 3 gives a screenshot of this scenario. The black Regions represent neutral towns, the red InfectionRegions represent towns under enemy control, and the green RemediationRegions represent towns under allied control. Companies are depicted by a red 'X' when infected and a black 'X' when uninfected.
Scenario 3: excursions from a forward operating base
This scenario also involves companies of soldiers equipped with mobile devices, but it takes place in a less structured environment than the previous examples. Here, the soldiers are all stationed at a forward operating base (FOB), represented as a RemediationRegion. After either resting at (Task.HOLD) or patrolling (Task.PATROL) the FOB for some amount of time, a Company receives orders to go out on an excursion, represented at the top level by the Random Waypoint movement pattern. Once a Company reaches each waypoint, however, it stays in place (Task.HOLD) while its constituent Platoons spread out radially (Task.FANOUT); the Squads in each Platoon then perform one of three Tasks: ATTACK (implemented using the Single Waypoint movement pattern), PATROL (implemented using the Random Waypoint in Region movement pattern), or EXPLORE (implemented using the Random Walk movement pattern). When the Squads'Tasks are complete, they all rally back to the Company location before moving on to the next waypoint. After some time, the Company receives orders to return to the FOB (Task.GOTO, implemented using the Single Waypoint movement pattern). One of the allied soldiers is actually an enemy spy, and at any time may infect her own mobile device with selfpropagating Bluetooth malware. When Units return to the FOB, a RemediationRegion, they are cleaned of the malware, but it may still spread amongst Units that are out on excursions. Figure 4 gives a screenshot of this scenario. The green Region represents the FOB. When uninfected, Companies are depicted by a black 'X', Platoons by a purple' + ', and Squads by a blue dot. Units turn red when infected.
Case study
We now present a case study based on Scenario 1 (excursions into a fown). 
Experimental setup
We develop and implement a discrete-time agent-based simulation model in Java based on the modeling framework presented in Section 3, which we then use to perform simulation experiments of malware spreading through a mobile tactical network as described in Scenario 1. All experiments are conducted on an Intel Core i7 processor operating at 2.40 GHz with 16 GB of memory running Windows 10.
We consider the equivalent of five companies, or 80 squads, operating in a circular town of radius 500 m (area ≈ 785,398 m 2 ). Squads move at a maximum speed of 1 m/s. Mobile devices have a transmission range of 9.0 meters, a typical range for a Bluetooth signal in an unobstructed environment, and begin each simulation in an uninfected state.
Simulations are run for 3,600 time steps, corresponding to a period of 12 hours to represent the activities of a typical day, with data collected at time intervals of t = 12 seconds. When not specified, results are averaged over 100 independent trials.
Sensitivity to mobility model
In a previous study 18 , we explored whether a hierarchical organizational and mobility model is necessary to capture the dynamics of malware spread in MTNs, or whether the same qualitative results can be achieved using simpler existing mobility models. In particular, we compared our hierarchical model to two commonly-used mobility models, the Random Walk and Random Waypoint models.
In the Hierarchical model, each of the 80 Squads begins the simulation at a random location within the Region corresponding to its Company's outpost. After performing Task.HOLD for a randomly chosen amount of time between 10 and 60 minutes, all four Squads in a Platoon perform Task.GOTO to a randomly chosen waypoint within the town Region. Once they reach the waypoint, the Squads go into Task.EXPLORE mode, independently moving in a random walk to simulate responding to local stimuli. After a randomly chosen amount of time between 30 minutes and 4 hours, all four Squads in the Platoon perform Task.GOTO back to their designated outpost, and the cycle repeats.
In the Random Walk and Random Waypoint models, the 80 Squads are treated as independent agents with no group awareness. Under the Random Walk model, at each time step, each Squad moves in a randomly chosen direction at a speed randomly selected between 0 m/s and their maximum speed, staying within the town Region. Under the Random Waypoint model, each Squad selects a random point in the town Region and moves in the direction of that point until it has reached it, at which time the Squad randomly selects a new point and continues in a similar fashion. Figure 5 shows screenshots from simulations in Repast Simphony under each of the three mobility models studied. Under the Random Walk model, Squads move locally but do not travel far from their points of origin. This results in the malware spreading slowly but steadily across the population in a spatial progression. Under the Random Waypoint model, Squads are constantly traveling the length of the environment. This results in a high rate of pairwise interactions, with any two Squads roughly equally likely to cross paths, and less spatial correlation between infected units. Under our hierarchical model, the pattern of spread is more complex, although it incorporates elements of the other two models: When traveling, Squads behave like under the Random Waypoint model, whereas when exploring they behave like under the Random Walk model. This is reflected in the spatial distribution of infected nodes, which includes a large contiguous area around the InfectionRegion as well as several other scattered clusters. Figure 6 (a) shows the size of the infected population over time, averaged over 100 independent runs of the simulation, with ranges of ± 1 standard deviation. The plot confirms that malware spreads much more quickly under the Random Waypoint model than the Random Walk model. The rate of spread under our hierarchical model seems to fall between that of the Random Walk and Random Waypoint models. Furthermore, the plot indicates that on average, each of the three models yields a sigmoidal growth curve typical of the compartmental models common to the ecological and epidemiological literature, indicating an initial exponential spread which slows down as the infection reaches its saturation point . 38, 21, 39 However, the standard deviations under the hierarchical and Random Walk models are relatively large, indicating that the behavior for different runs of the simulation may vary significantly. To get a more fine-grained view of the dynamics of malware spread under each of the models, we examine the results of a single run of the simulation, shown in Figure  6 (b). Although the growth curves were sigmoidal for all three models when averaged over many independent trials, for a single simulation run the Random Walk model yields roughly linear growth in the number of squads with infected devices, which matches our observation of the malware's spatial progression. On the other hand, the growth curve for our sample simulation run under the Random Waypoint model is still sigmoidal and very similar to the corresponding averaged growth curve, which is not surprising given the relatively small standard deviation for the Random Waypoint model, as seen in Figure 6 (a).
The hierarchical model does not exhibit either extreme of slow, almost-linear growth or fast, sigmoidal growth. Instead, it demonstrates a hybrid mix of periods of slow growth as Squads come within range of one another on the battlefield along with more rapid growth as Squads pass one another while traveling, punctuated by short spurts of step-wise growth as each Squad returns to its outpost and propagates the malware to the other Squads in its Platoon and to other Platoons that have returned to the outpost at the same time. This suggests that security interventions that focus on rally points or highlytraveled areas may be an effective way to combat Bluetooth, or other proximity-based malware spread in MTNs.
Context-based defense policies
In Thompson et al. 19 , we explore the effectiveness of several context-based defense strategies in slowing the spread of malware in MTNs. We frame them here as policies, but these approaches could alternatively be implemented using technological solutions, such as upgrading to more secure hardware, running more robust anti-malware software, or using Bluetooth-jamming technology. In particular, we consider three classes of defense policies, consecutively more robust but potentially also more costly or tactically inhibitive:
• Fortified outposts: Policies are implemented to prevent malware from spreading to or from devices carried by units at an outpost (e.g. requiring soldiers to disable Bluetooth before entering an outpost). • Fortified noncombat: Policies are implemented to prevent malware from spreading to or from devices carried by units that are not currently in combat (i.e. at an outpost or in transit).
• Fortified always: Policies are implemented to prevent malware from spreading to or from devices carried by units at all times.
The intuition behind protecting outposts is that the high concentration of units in a small space facilitates the rapid propagation of malware, as observed in the results above. This is also the least likely time that Bluetooth communication would be necessary from a tactical perspective, so implementations of this policy based on preventing Bluetooth communication entirely may not be unreasonable. Another high-risk time for malware spread is when units are in transit to or from a combat operation, since they may cover a lot of ground in a short period of time, increasing their likelihood of interacting with other units along the way. Finally, while being the most robust solution, protecting units at all times may be prohibitively expensive or interfere with critical communication capabilities between units in combat situations. For a baseline, we also evaluate the spread of malware when no defensive policy is used. Figure 7 shows the progression of the malware over time when each of the defense policies is implemented for all units. The plot of the baseline No Defense policy has the expected sigmoidal shape commonly observed when studying infectious disease spread through a population, indicating an initial exponential spread which slows down as the infection reaches the saturation point.
Despite the high concentration of units at the outposts, we see that fortified outposts provides little improvement over the baseline. This may be because Squads are most likely to coincide at an outpost with other Squads in their Platoon, for which there are ample other times for them to interact and spread the malware when they are not at the outpost. This would likely be different if the simulation included nights, during which all of the Squads in a Company may be at the outpost simultaneously.
The fortified noncombat strategy, on the other hand, shows significant improvement over the baseline in slowing the spread of the malware, taking almost 7 hours to reach 50% infection as opposed to about 3 hours when no defensive strategy is used. Perhaps even more surprisingly, the infection curve is nearly linear rather than sigmoidal. This is less surprising, however, when considering that the small local movements of units during combat do not fit the typical homogeneous mixing assumption common to the infectious disease literature.
The fortified always strategy trivially achieves 0% infection because none of the units are susceptible to the malware. In practice, however, this may be hard to achieve due to logistical reasons, imperfect compliance with military policies, or the prohibitive monetary or temporal cost of maintaining up-to-date and robust security technology. Next, we consider the effectiveness of the defense policies when 100% adoption is not feasible. Figure 8 shows the progression of the malware over time when only 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80% of the units are implementing a given policy. Although the fortified outposts policy does not show significant improvement with greater adoption, we see a significant flattening of the infection curves for the fortified noncombat and fortified always strategies. This is even more pronounced for the fortified always policy because in addition to breaking the homogeneous mixing assumption as mentioned above, it lowers the upper bound of possible infected units because a fortified device will never get infected, and at the same time decreases the density-and therefore the interaction rate-of unprotected units. As a result, the marginal benefit of fortifying additional units increases as more units are fortified. This is clearly demonstrated by the plot in Figure 9 , which shows that the time until 33% infection increases super-linearly with respect to the fraction of units adopting the policy.
Impact of policy compliance
Conclusions
In this work, we presented an agent-based modeling framework to study malware spread in mobile tactical networks. Our primary goal was to fill a gap in existing models of MTNs, namely the connection between organizational structure, movement patterns, and cybersecurity. We achieved that through a framework that includes militaryinspired models of hierarchical command structure, unit movement, communication over short-range radio, self-propagating malware, and anti-malware defensive mechanisms. Depending on application-specific needs, our framework could be coupled with higher-fidelity models of mission and task definitions, the tactical environment and terrain, wireless communication, or cyber attack and defense.
The interplay between hierarchical command and control and group mobility is the key concept behind our framework. The hierarchical organization of tactical units, sub-tasking of tactical orders, and highly-structured and coordinated movement and behavior are fundamental principles of military strategy, yet the relationships between them and their impact on cybersecurity are not captured by existing models of mobile tactical networks. As previous work has demonstrated, agent-based modeling is particularly well-suited for representing the complex organizational and spatial structures inherent to military operations, especially MTNs. Our results further support this claim, while additionally capturing these key relationships and inter-dependencies.
We implemented our framework in Java, as well as several example scenarios representing military units equipped with Bluetooth-enabled mobile devices engaged in tactical operations on a synthetic battlefield. In one scenario, soldiers stationed at outposts around the periphery of a town conduct excursions into the town seeking out and engaging with enemy soldiers. Another scenario considers companies being deployed and redeployed to different towns connected by a road network, some of which are controlled by the enemy and some of which are under allied control. In a third scenario, companies stationed at an FOB are deployed on attack, patrol, or exploratory missions.
In a series of experiments, we used our implementation to explore cybersecurity issues under one of the scenarios. In the first experiment, we found that malware spread under our military-inspired hierarchical mobility model exhibits complex dynamics that are not captured by common mobility models such as Random Walk and Random Waypoint, suggesting that caution should be taken in transferring existing results for malware spread in MANETs to the tactical domain. In the next experiment, we evaluated the relative effectiveness of several defensive strategies in slowing the rate of malware spread, in particular exploring the trade-off between robustness of security and adverse impact on tactical capabilities. Our final experiment considered the effectiveness of cyber defense strategies when there is not 100% adoption or compliance. The results indicate that technological solutions that enforce compliance, even if resources are only available for partial adoption, may be more effective than widely-adopted policy solutions that only garner partial compliance.
We note that the experimental results presented in this work should be interpreted qualitatively, as they are highly dependent on contextual and environmental parameters. Their purpose here is to illustrate the benefits of agentbased modeling for representing the complex hierarchical and spatial structures inherent to MTNs and to highlight the need for more extensive research to better understand the risks that the growing threat of cyber attack poses for military operations. We encourage others to incorporate the core principles of our framework into existing tools along with higher-fidelity models of other aspects of MTNs, giving military leaders a more accurate and comprehensive system with which to evaluate cyber defense strategies, thus enabling them to make more informed decisions when trying to secure MTNs against cyber attack.
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